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1 Introduction
In the software industry, more and
more products are offered as systems
that are composed of complementary
components. Certain components constitute the core product which is the
center of a so-called “Software Ecosystem” (SECO). In addition, complementary components are offered by independent vendors (Bosch 2009, p. 1). SECOs
are generally defined as “a set of actors functioning as a unit and interacting with a shared market for software and
services, together with the relationships

among them. These relationships are frequently underpinned by a common technological platform or market and operate
through the exchange of information, resources and artifacts” (Jansen et al. 2009,
p. 35). The idea to offer software systems based on core products combined
with complementary solutions from an
ecosystem is applied in both the businessto-business (B2B) and the business-toconsumer (B2C) sector. Examples in the
B2C sector are Apple with its App Store,
Google with its Android Marketplace and
Microsoft with its Windows Phone Marketplace. The App Store is the biggest
SECO of these examples having sold 160
million consumer devices (so-called iOS
devices; as of December 2010) and with
70.000 independent vendors participating in the US App Store.1 In the B2B sector, several providers pursue similar approaches. Companies like salesforce.com
with AppExchange, SugarCRM with SugarExchange, NetSuite with SuiteApp.com,
Google with the Google Apps Marketplace
and Microsoft with Pinpoint run marketplaces to supplement their products with
complementary applications. These applications are either offered by the respective company itself or by independent
vendors.
In the existing literature, different types
of actors in a SECO are identified and
differentiated into “hubs”, “niche players”, and “customers” (Iansiti and Levien
2004, pp. 5 and 9). While the hub
provides the software platform2 as the
SECO’s core product, niche players offer specialized products around the core,
typically sold via marketplaces like the
App Store. Although in most cases niche
players are numerous, their influence on
the SECO is generally limited. Depending on the strategy followed by the hub,
three different roles of the hub can be
distinguished: the “keystone”, the “physical dominator”, and the “value dominator”. While keystones are characterized by
the benevolence of their behavior, physical and value dominators try to dominate

a large percentage of the offered products in SECOs or of their value respectively (Iansiti and Levien 2004, pp. 6–9;
Bosch 2009, p. 7). In literature, the characteristics of SECOs (e.g., the composition of the SECO in terms of actor types,
entry barriers, and robustness of the system; cf., for example, Jansen et al. 2009)
and the motives of its actors, as, for example, market access from the perspective of
the niche players (e.g., Hilkert et al. 2010)
have been analyzed.

2 Software Ecosystems from
a Network Eﬀect Perspective
An important underlying economic concept of SECOs is described in the theory of so-called two-sided markets. Rysman (2009, p. 125) defines these as markets “in which (1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and (2) the decisions of each set of
agents affects the outcomes of the other
set of agents, typically through an externality.” Within SECOs, the two actor
types, niche players and customers, each
constitute one side of the market. Based
on the interaction within and between
the two sides, so-called network effects
occur. Network effects are present when
the utility of an item depends on the
number of customers using this good. In
the context of two-sided markets both
consumers and niche players can be considered as users. Literature distinguishes
between direct and indirect network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985, p. 424;
cf. Fig. 1). While direct network effects
occur on the same side (e.g., by a data
exchange between consumers), indirect
network effects occur on the respective
other side of the two-sided market (e.g.,
caused by an increase of complementary
niche solutions offered).
Figure 2 shows the number of niche
solutions in the B2B marketplaces presented above.3 For AppExchange and NetSuite the initial publication dates of niche

1 Determined

by means of the “Framework for automated Data Collection in Online Marketplaces” (FaDOM) as of beginning of March 2011.
et al. (2006, p. vii) describe a software platform as “a software program that makes services available to other software programs through
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).”
3 The data are collected weekly by FaDOM since 2010. For every marketplace only Software as a Service products are considered (e.g., the category
“Online Application”) for reasons of comparability. The data for Pinpoint refer to the US version. The gap at AppExchange results from a deficient
data collection on 2010-11-15 which was not included in the evaluation.
2 Evans
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3.1 Openness of the Software Platform

Fig. 1 Direct and indirect network effects
solutions are publicly available. Therefore, the time period before our first collection (marked by vertical black lines)
can also be shown. While analyzing the
data, we noticed that already at the time
of the launch of the marketplace salesforce.com offered a significant amount
of niche solutions itself via so-called
dependent niche vendors (compare the
curve “AppExchange” with the curve
“AppExchange – independent niche players only”).4 Furthermore, in the following, constantly new niche solutions are
offered by salesforce.com on AppExchange
(notice the increasing distance between
the two curves for AppExchange). However, for all other examined hubs the percentage of own niche solutions offered is
low compared to the entire number of
solutions in the respective marketplace
(<1.35%).
A possible explanation for salesforce.com’s approach can be the so-called
“chicken and egg problem” which results from indirect network effects on
two-sided markets (Katz and Shapiro
1994, p. 102). Typically, at the time of
a SECO’s market-launch, neither niche
players nor customers are present: While
niche players take into account the number of potential customers for the decision whether to participate in a marketplace, the customers preferably join
marketplaces which offer a large number
of complementary solutions. Therefore,
it is difficult for a hub to gain both niche
players and customers. From the hub’s
perspective, an approach to solve this
problem during the launch phase of a
marketplace, is presented by offering own
niche solutions (e.g., Katz and Shapiro
1994, p. 102; cf. Fig. 2). Thus, the attractiveness of the platform as perceived by
customers can be enhanced.
Multi-homing is a further aspect discussed in the context of the theory of

two-sided markets. It can be defined as
the strategy of vendors or customers to
use more than one platform in order to
reach more customers or to use more
niche solutions respectively (Armstrong
2006, p. 669).
Figure 3 shows the relations of the respective niche players (circles)5 to the
considered hubs (squares) for the examined B2B environment, i.e. the presence
of at least one niche solution offered by
the respective niche player in the respective marketplace. The dependent niche
players are depicted by means of the pattern of the respective market. It is striking, that the niche player salesforce.com
(small checked circle) is the only dependent vendor active in two marketplaces.
Furthermore, we note that none of the
vendors offer solutions in all five examined marketplaces. Only three vendors
are active in four marketplaces, while six
vendors are active in three marketplaces.
73 vendors offer applications in two marketplaces. In the context of B2C SECOs
multi-homing can be observed on the
vendor side as well. For example, niche
solutions of the social network Facebook
or the game Flight Control are offered for
various SECOs.

3 Design Options of a Hub
When it comes to providing a platform
and possibly a marketplace for niche solutions, from the hub’s perspective several design decisions have to be taken, especially concerning the openness of the
software platform, the management of
the niche players and the revenue model
(Buxmann et al. 2011, pp. 197–203; Roson 2005, p. 146).

The openness of a software platform particularly refers to the degree of restrictions with respect to development, commercialization, and use of the platform.
A platform is said to be completely open
if no restrictions concerning the mentioned aspects apply. Furthermore, a differentiation between horizontal and vertical openness can be made (Eisenmann
et al. 2009, pp. 131–133).
Horizontal openness describes the relations of the hub to other platforms.
Apart from licensing new platform operators and including platform sponsors
which participate in the further development of the platform, it is an important
design decision whether to make the platform compatible with other platforms
(Eisenmann et al. 2009, pp. 137–142). In
this context, compatibility is defined as
the ability to integrate niche solutions
of competing platforms into the own
platform (Katz and Shapiro 1985, p. 425).
While horizontal openness refers to the
relations with other platforms, vertical
openness affects the relations of a hub
with the niche players. Design decisions
concern backward compatibility (securing the functioning of existing niche solutions in updated platform versions), the
ex post integration of (mostly successful) niche solutions into the platform (incorporation of functionalities of a niche
solution into the functions of the platform; hereby, the respective niche solution might become obsolete for the consumer) as well as the exclusiveness of
niche solutions. In this context, exclusiveness stands, for example, for the contractual inhibition of multi-homing on the
vendor’s side. For the hub, the advantage
of such a strategy is the fact that certain
niche solutions are available to the consumers only on its own platform. Another aspect is the exclusion of rival niche
solutions. This gives niche players the advantage of securing a business segment
for their own niche solution exclusively
(Eisenmann et al. 2009, pp. 143–146;
Cusumano and Gawer 2002, p. 53).
We can illustrate the development of
vertical openness by the example of Apple’s iOS platform. When the iOS platform was launched, it was only available for Apple’s own niche solutions.

4 The mapping of dependent vendors was conducted by name of the vendor. The three vendors “Force.com Labs” (246 niche solutions),
“salesforce.com” (10 niche solutions) and “Salesforce.com Foundation” (5 niche solutions) could be identified as dependent niche vendors.
5 The bigger, the more niche solutions; the size of the biggest, checked circle – Force.com Labs – was reduced due to the large number of niche
solutions. Note that the positions of the circles in the figure have no meaning.
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Fig. 2 Number of Software
as a Service niche solutions
per SECO in the B2B sector

Fig. 3 Multi-homing by
vendor in the B2B sector
(2011-02-28)

Later on, with the launch of the App
Store, it opened up for niche solutions
of independent vendors. Since then, Apple takes the role of a so-called “gatekeeper”, as it verifies niche solutions before their obligatory release in the App
Store. While, for example, the release of
Google Voice was delayed for a long time,
other applications were completely rejected by Apple. Furthermore, the iOS
platform relies on its own development
environment so that niche solutions cannot be transferred to or from competing platforms without adjustments (cf.
horizontal openness).
3.2 Management of Niche Players
Due to the increasing enhancement of the
hub’s core product through niche soluBusiness & Information Systems Engineering

tions, handling of niche players gains in
importance for the hub (Yoffie and Kwak
2006, p. 90). On the one hand, the hub
has to determine the boundaries of the
SECO, i.e., apart from specifying the core
product (e.g., the platform and the associated marketplace) it is necessary to determine geographic boundaries or licensing rights for the niche players. Another
aspect in this context is the degree of support for niche players which is expressed,
for instance, in sharing intellectual property with them or in communicating
long-term development plans (Jansen et
al. 2009, pp. 36–43).
The management of niche players influences their composition. Figure 4 exemplarily shows the development of the
niche players’ composition for the Apps
Marketplace and AppExchange over time.
1|2012

For example, whereas 370 vendors (i.e.,
72.1%) offer one niche solution, 74 vendors offer two niche solutions on AppExchange. Similar percentages of vendors
offering only one niche solution apply
to the Apps Marketplace (84.0%), Pinpoint (85.5%), SugarExchange (81.0%)
and SuiteApp.com (78.8%). In general,
two growth types can be distinguished for
the total number of niche solutions: on
the one hand, growth due to new vendors, on the other hand, growth due to
new niche solutions by vendors which
already participate in the marketplace.
While, as of 2010-05-17, 81.8% of the
vendors in the Apps Marketplace offered
only one niche solution, on 2011-02-28
the percentage had grown to 84.0%. On
AppExchange the corresponding percentage only varied slightly around 73.7% un43
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dor. However, the costs for the authorization process of a commercial niche solution amount to USD 300 in the first year
and USD 150 annually from the second
year. In conclusion, it seems with regard
to the considered design decisions that
providers of new SECOs merely imitate
successful models. A possible explanation
may be that the development of theories explaining the interdependencies between the design decisions of a SECO
(Sect. 3) and the success of an ecosystem
is still subject to current research.
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